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THE CONGLOMERATE AS AN
INVESTMENT VEHICLE
JEROME S. KATZIN*
Regardless of any possible correlation between the level of stock market
prices and women's skirts, it is readily demonstrable that there are fashions
in investment. So pronounced is the herding impulse among investors, that
a more appropriate symbol of Wall Street might well be a sheep instead of
the embattled bull and bear.
The transiency of investment popularity is well illustrated by the rise
and decline of the "conglomerate" as an investment vehicle. Over the last
decade, this group attained separate identification, was accorded a high
market multiple as a reflection of wide popularity and expectation, and then
fell into disrepute when these expectations began to meet disappointment.
The coveted conglomerate (or mini-conglomerate) label was quickly aban-
doned. Management either took full-page ads in financial journals to explain
to analysts why their particular company should have a different classifica-
tion, or tried to demonstrate by speech and testimony what made them dis-
tinguishable from all the others.
Although the conglomerate label is a recent invention, the multi-faceted
company is not. Many of the largest industrial concerns engage in a wide
range of activities, some of which are quite unrelated to the main area of
corporate identification. What characterizes the modern conglomerate is
that its primary impetus for growth comes from the acquisition of other
companies, usually bearing no operating relationship or industrial connec-
tion with each other.
A number of circumstances joined to produce the modern conglom-
erate. Not least in importance has been the antitrust laws which severely
limit acquisitions within the same industry, either horizontally or vertically.
Generally, growth into a new area of endeavor can be accomplished more
cheaply and safely through acquisition of a going concern than by starting
afresh. The difficulties of breaking into a new line, of gathering and proving
management, of achieving market acceptance, of attaining profitable levels,
and of successfully overcoming all the known and unknown hazards of a
new business are avoided if an existing business can be acquired. Not only
can companies rapidly and securely change the direction of their business
through carefully selected acquisitions, but revenues and profits per share
can also be made to increase dramatically. The prestige and other emol-
uments of size can thereby be achieved with a minimum of peril and in
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fairly rapid fashion through a series of acquisitions. When the law prohibits
the joining of companies with a natural affinity, there will be pressure to
acquire those without.
The market, during this period, has been particularly receptive to new
modes of investment. As the depression-tempered generation passed from
responsibility for money management, they were replaced by a new breed
of investors who emphasized market performance over stability, earnings
over asset value, and capital gain rather than yield. This concentration
on market performance created, instead of long-term values, a demand for
stocks of companies which were active performers in the market. A company
on a dynamic acquisition program commands attention, gives opportunity
for quick profit in the premium customarily paid for the acquired company,
and the promise of rapid earnings improvement justifies not only higher
stock prices but higher multiples as well.
There is, in fact, a good deal of difference in the management and
philosophy of companies in the conglomerate group. Some seek to acquire
companies with some operating relationship which common ownership can
make more efficient, the so-called "synergy." Some get extensively involved
in the management of the operating divisions and subsidiaries. Others
austerely limit themselves to a small, highly proficient money management
and supervisory team, leaving the divisions relative autonomy except for
money decisions, budgeting, and insistance on meeting performance goals.
But, regardless of style, market acceptance and popularity can evaporate
quite suddenly if performance falters. A problem division which fails to
meet its earnings goals immediately has repercussions, and if the difficulty is
deep and lasting, the stock market proves an inconstant corroborator. A loss
period, a levelling of the rate of growth, a subsidiary in difficulty, and
market deflation follows promptly, affecting not only the particular com-
pany, but casting a shadow on the entire group.
The continued prosperity of the conglomerate, of course, depends upon
its ability to maintain a high market multiple for its shares, so that its securi-
ties can be used as the medium for acquiring companies with a lower market
earnings multiple. This permits the acquirer to pay a premium for those
earnings, and, at the same time, to augment its own earnings per share, even
after allowance for the additional dilution.
This smooth system of escalating the value of earnings through incor-
poration into the more highly regarded conglomerate comes apart when the
market ceases to accord a higher multiple to the combination. This will
occur when the inherent inadequacies of any of the acquired companies
appear. There is generally a reason for the original lower market valuation
of the acquisition. This may be temporarily obscured when the cofiglomerate
takes over. The new management can give the enterprise an improved image.
Operations will be closely scrutinized; excess working capital will be
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squeezed out and put to work earning maximum yield; loss operations will,'
be pared; personnel cut; there may be accounting changes; and a more
aggressive and modern stance will replace the accustomed ways. But if the
company is in a mature or troubled industry, its future rate of growth will
remain limited. It may require extensive plant modernization and heavy
capital expenditures to stay competitive. Unrevealed weaknesses may sud-
denly emerge. The market's original appraisal of the company is vindicated.
After all, a marginal steel company with an 8 times multiple does not by a
simple transfer of ownership suddenly become a glamour company entitled
to 20 times plus. Doubts arise about the sagacity and miracle-working powers
of the conglomerate's management. As there is a falling off in the valuation
of the conglomerate, the smooth process of compounding growth and multi-
ple goes into rapid reverse. With a lowered market multiple, opportunities
for growth through acquisition diminish; this reduces the rate of growth,
and, in turn, the multiple is further lowered. The conglomerate must turn
into itself to produce growth and improved earnings. This may prove
difficult.
Another factor contributing to the functioning of the conglomerate has
been the availability of different accounting conventions. Pooling has per-
mitted acquisitions at a substantial premium over underlying book value of
assets without requiring amortization of that premium against subsequent
earnings. On the other hand, where assets are acquired at less than book
value, the merger can take the form of purchase which permits the discount
to be amortized in a fashion that increases reported earnings, although, in
fact, there has been no change in profitability. Until recent changes in re-
porting for convertible securities and common stock equivalents, it was possi-
ble to delay the full dilution effect of an acquisition and temporarily give a
further lift to per share earnings.
The conglomerate's emphasis on rising per share earnings as the mea-
sure of accomplishment has also created pressures to maximize leverage in
its capitalization. As acquisition premiums rise in the competition for com-
panies, the tax-free exchange (using common, preferred, or convertible pre-
ferred shares) becomes less crucial and the use of debt, sometimes with
convertibility or warrants as a sweetener, becomes feasible. High federal
corporate income tax rates with deductibility of interest enables a full return
to be paid on the debt, and with the narrower equity base, to report better
earnings per share. This becomes even more attractive if an installment
purchase, using debt, defers the taxable event until cash is actually received.
These devices have now been limited by the Tax Reform Act of 1969, while
high interest rates have further discouraged the use of debt securities. The
addition of tiers of corporations, each leveraged with debt, and controlled,
but not wholly-owned is another aspect of the modern conglomerate which
requires examination and clarification. These multiple-level companies
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bring to mind the public utility holding companies of the 1920's which
produced the corrective restraints of the Public Utility Holding Company
Act of 1935.
There is a place in our economy for the diversified corporation. Modem
management has proven that it can handle large and diverse operations effi-
ciently and profitably. The dynamics of our economic system will always
reward managers capable of producing growth and utilizing assets more
profitably. The door should not be closed to mergers and consolidations.
They serve an essential purpose in our economy, bringing revitalization to
inefficient or backward companies, and offering a home to the small com-
pany, the family-owned business, or the undercapitalized venture which can
no longer make it alone. Improved reporting, the breaking out of divisional
figures, more uniform accounting, and the development of better financial
analytical techniques, will assure that with longer experience each company,
whether called conglomerate or diversified, will be judged on its individual
merit, as it properly should, and not by some vague categorization or the
dictates of fashion.
